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Abstract- Most of the proposed security protocols for routing 
optimization in Mobile IPv6, including the one in the standard, 
depend on the special relationship between the home network 
and the mobile node. In this paper, we present a new protocol 
that does not depend on the security relationship between the 
home network and the mobile. The security of the protocol is 
analyzed and its performance evaluation is given. The results 
of performance evaluation show that our protocol achieves 
strong security and at the same time requires minimal 
computational overhead compared to return routability 
procedure. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
 
obile IPv6 (MIPv6) has been proposed as an IP layer 
mobility protocol for the IPv6 [1]. The Mobile IPv6 
standardization process started in 1995. The recent 
developments in public wireless networks convey that IPv6 
nodes on a local link cannot necessarily trust each other 
anymore. They now become mutually suspicious, even 
when the nodes have completed an authentication exchange 
with the network. This had added a number of new security 
threats as well [3]. In addition, the lack of a global 
authentication infrastructure made it very hard to solve the 
problems with straightforward application of standard 
Internet security protocols, such as IPSec and IKE. For 
many of such reasons, the standardization of Mobile IPv6 
was delayed. 
Many schemes are introduced to provide security to Mobile 
IPv6.The method of route optimization is introduced to 
avoid triangle routing and which also removes some of the 
plain IPv6 vulnerabilities. For instance, the use of Secure 
Neighbor Discovery on the network where one of the end-
points resides, removes some of the existing threats [4]. Yet, 
a security association alone is not sufficient to enhance 
security mechanism. General security associations typically 
do not show that a node owns a specific IP address, a 
property that is desired in the case of route optimization to 
authenticate home addresses. Certificate technology, for 
instance, usually does not track the correct IP address 
assignments of a large group of users. Also, the validity of 
care-of addresses cannot be ensured by a security  
Association  alone. Either the security association must be 
accompanied by a trust relationship, or care-of addresses 
must be checked otherwise. This shows that enhancements 
to the security of route optimization are likely to employ 
Mobile IPv6 specific technology rather than general- 
purpose security tools. 
In addition to above, many research problems that exist that 
can be divided as follows. 
i. Most of the proposed security protocols for Mobile 
IPv6; including the one in the standard, depend on 
the special relationship between the home network 
and the mobile. It is a completely open question, 
what kind of security mechanisms would be needed 
if the home agent did not trust the information 
provided by the mobile. 
ii. Finding care-of address verification mechanisms 
that employ lower layer assistance or SEcure 
Neighbour Discovery[4]. 
iii. Finding route optimization security mechanisms 
that do not require a reconfiguration of the shared 
secret between mobile node and its correspondent 
node. 
iv. Developing adaptive out-of-band security 
mechanisms that are not specific to the deployment 
environment of a network operator. 
v. Extending the developed mechanisms to full 
multiaddressing, i.e., including also multi-homing. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the 
section(2) we focus the state-of-art of the existing routing 
optimization protocols and  Section(3) emphasizes on the 
security of these protocols and their limitations are 
specified. Then in Section(4) we are presenting a protocol 
that is able to give a solution to a research problem that is 
stated in (a). Finally, we conclude our remarks in Section 
(5). 
 
II SECURITY ANALYSIS OF RO PROTOCOLS 
 
A. Return Routabilty 
 
The secure RO[5] in the MIPv6 is composed of six 
messages and is shown in Figure 1. The first four messages 
are dedicated to checking the RR of the |RO protocol, and 
the last two messages are used to authenticate the message. 
M 
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Figure 1: Return routability protocol 
 
Figure.1 shows an illustration of secure routing optimization 
in MIPv6. The MN-HA path is securely protected by the 
IPSec tunnel. 
The MN sends the Home Test Init () and the Care-of Test 
Init (CoTI) messages to initiate the binding update. These 
two messages are sent almost simultaneously but along 
different paths; the CoTI is sent directly to the CN , and the 
HoTI is sent indirectly via the HA. HoTI and CoTI 
messages are sent to trigger the test packets. 
The MN sends the Home Test (HoT) and the Care-of Test 
(CoT) messages as responses to the previous messages. The 
HoT message is sent to the source address of HoTI while 
CoT message is sent to the source address of the CoTI. The 
HoT message consists of a home token which is calculated 
by taking  the hash function over the concatenation of a 
secret key Kcn  known only by the CN, the source address 
of the HoTI packet, and a nonce ni.The index i is also 
included in the HoT packet,to allow the CN to find the 
appropriate nonce. Similarly the CoT message consists of a 
care-of token which is calculated by taking  the hash 
function over the concatenation of a secret key Kcn  known 
only by the CN, CoA, and a nonce nj. 
 When MN receives both home token and care-of token it 
calculates a key Kbm by taking a hash function over the 
concatenation of home token and care-of token. By using 
secret key kbm it sends the actual binding update (BU) 
message to CN.After receiving BU message CN sends a 
binding acknowledgement (BA) message to MN.  
 
B. Certificate Based Binding Update (Cbu) Protocol 
 
In CBU[6]When MN wants to start RO operation with CN, 
it sends a RO request REQ = {HoA, CN, n0} to CN via 
reserved tunneling, where n0 is a nonce value used to match 
the reply message REP. Message REQ is sent to MN‘s HA 
via the IPSec protected secure tunnel.  
Upon arriving at HA, REQ is intercepted by HA and it will 
not forward REQ to CN, instead, it creates a cookie C0 and 
sends COOKIE0 = {HoA, CN, C0} to CN.  
In reply, CN creates a nonce n1 and a cookie C1, and sends 
COOKIE1 = {CN, HoA, C0, C1, n1} to MN.  
After receiving COOKIE1, HA checks on the validity of C0 
and  replies CN with EXCH0 = {HoA, CN, C0, C1, n1, n2, 
gx, TS, SIGHA, CertHA}, where  n2 is a freshly generated 
nonce, x a Diffie– Hellman (DH) secret value,  SIGHA = 
SHA(HoA|CN|g
x|n1|n2|TS) , CertHA = {HLSP, PHA, 
Valid_Interval, SIGCA} is the public key certificate of HA.  
When CN receives EXCH0, it validates the cookies, the 
HA‘s public key certificate CertHA, the signature and 
importantly, checks for equality of the HA‘s subnet prefix 
strings embedded in both CertHA and HoA. If all the 
validations and checking are positive, CN can be confident 
that the home address HoA of MN is authorized by its HA 
and the DH public value gx is freshly generated by MN‘s 
HA. CN next generates its own secret value y and its public 
value gy, and then computes the DH key KDH = (g
x)y, a 
session key KBU = prf(KDH, n1|n2) and a MAC MAC1 = 
prf(KBU, g
y|EXCH0), and sends EXCH1 = {CN, HoA, C0, 
C1, gy, MAC1} to MN.  
 
Fig. 2 CBU Protocol 
 
Again, this message is intercepted by HA, which first 
validates the cookies, calculates the KDH = (g
y)x and KBU = 
prf(KDH, n1|n2).  
HA then computes MAC2 = prf(KBU, EXCH1), and sends 
an optional CONFIRM = {HoA, CN, MAC2} to CN. The 
validity of MAC2 is checked by CN and if valid, CN creates 
a cache entry for HoA and the session key KBU, which will 
be used for authenticating binding update messages from 
MN. Upon positive verification of MAC1, HA also sends 
REP = {CN, HoA, n0, KBU} to MN through the secure 
IPSec ESP protected tunnel. After receiving REP, MN 
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checks that n0 is the same as the one it sent out in REQ. If 
so, MN proceeds to send CN binding update messages 
protected using KBU as in the RR protocol. Once CN 
receives BU message it sends an acknowledgement to MN. 
 
C. Hierarchical Certificate Based Binding Update 
Protocol(Hcbu) 
 
In HCBU[7], When MN realizes an imminent handover , it 
first initializes a Binding Update request in Message 1. 
 Message 1. Binding Update Request (BUReq): {BU, Nm, 
HoA, CN} 
where Nm is a fresh random nonce. 
Message 2 passes the fresh nonce Nm, MN‘s HoA, CN‘s 
address and a DH public value gx to CN. 
Message 2. Pre-Information Exchange0 (EXCH0): 
{Nm, HoA, CN, gx}. 
In reply, CN attaches its own fresh nonce NC and DH public 
value gy to the received Message 2 and thus forms Message 
3.  
Message 3. Pre-Information Exchange1 (EXCH1): 
{Nm, Nc, HoA, CN, gx, gy , CookieCN} 
where  CookieCN =prf(KCN, Nm|Nc|HoA|CN|g
x|gy) 
CN next creates a cookie CookieCN for HA using its own 
secret key KCN.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 HCBU Protocol 
 
III ANALYSIS OF THE RO PROTOCOLS 
 
The goal in designing  IPv6 is to make MIPv6 at least as 
secure as static IPv6. But  MIPv6 introduced some security 
vulnerabilities. Among which weak authentication and 
authorization of BUs is considered as the biggest 
vulnerability. These malicious Binding Updates open the 
door for many types of attacks like False Binding Update 
attack , Man – in-the-Middle Attack , Denial-of-Service 
Attack.   
 In the RR protocol , liveness test for the MN is done, but it 
is prone to false BU attack and session hijacking attack and 
Distributed DoS attacks as anytained to anyone who obtains 
Home Token and Care of token can create  the session key 
Kbm. Moreover the path between CN and HA is not 
secured.To overcome these drawbacks , a variation of the 
RR protocol is recently proposed in  
  In the CBU protocol, The task of authenticating MN and its 
HoA is done by issuing individual certificates. But the 
protocol does not address certificate management issues for 
HA‘s. the prcess of certificate issuing is done directly to 
every individual home link subnet prefix by one CA which 
is not practical. This flat structure of trust management is 
not flexible and scalable. Another problem with the CBU 
protocol is that there is no way for CN to assure liveness of 
MN on its claimed CoA in the BU message. 
The drawbacks of CBU protocol are overcome by HCBU 
protocol presented in the previous section. It uses a flexible 
and scalable 3-layer trust management framework for 
certificate management. Based on such a framework it is 
assured that both the mobile nodes Home address and Care 
of address are authenticated to CN. This is considered as a 
secured tunnel between a MN and HA. Hence in HCBU, 
computational costs on the protocol participants are reduced 
.and also latency of this protocol is fairly low. 
Communication efficiency is also achieved by using early 
binding update. Inspite of all these advantages there is an 
assumption that a secure tunnel is established between the 
MN and HA.  To remove such an assumption we present a 
new protocol  in the next section that can be considered as 
an enhancement to HCBU. 
 
IV EFFICIENT HIERARCHICAL CERTIFICATE  
BASED BINDING UPDATE PROTOCOL 
 
In HCBU, existence of a secure tunnel between a MN and 
HA is an assumption.. This assumption has two drawbacks. 
1) In practice such a secure tunnel can be established by 
exchanging secret keys between HA and all other nodes in 
the home network.  If the intruder performs eavesdropping 
on the packets that are used to exchange the secret keys, 
then the intruder also gets the secret key. 2) If at all such a 
secure tunnel is established between MN and HA, it should 
also exist between HA and CN. It is because even a CN can 
be a MN. 
To overcome the above specified drawbacks, we proposed a 
protocol ―Efficient Hierarchical Certificate based Binding 
Update Protocol‖ as an improvement to HCBU. In this 
protocol we remove the assumption of a secure tunnel. 
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Fig. 4 . Efficient Hierarchical Certificate based Binding 
Update Protocol       
 
The Proposed Scheme 
The shortages in RR procedure and CBU protocols are 
widely discussed in current years that lead to the increased 
proportion of mobile users. Many papers have proposed 
improved mechanisms in terms of security enhancement, but 
very few of them are proposed with out taking secure tunnel 
into consideration. 
Our proposed protocol EHCBU consists of  8 steps. First 3 
steps are carried out when the MN discovers an imminent 
handover and the remaining after the handover. 
 
Step 1 
 
When the MN realizes that the handover is forthcoming, it 
sends a BU Request to HA. 
BUReq : {BU , Nm , HoA , CN} 
In this message MN sends its Home address , Correspondent 
node‘s address and a fresh random nonce Nm. 
 
Step 2 
 
HA exchanges pre information needed for Diffsie Hellman 
Key exchange in the message 2. HA constructs the packet 
        {Nm , HoA , CN , gx} 
 
Step 3 
 
In reply CN also exchanges similar pre information with the 
HA.So it creates the packet as 
{Nm , Nc , HoA , CN , gx , gy , CookieCN}, 
where  CookieCN = prf(KCN , Nm | Nc | HoA | CN | g
x | gy} 
 
 
 
Step 4 
Immediately after the hand over MN sends a CoA 
registration Request to HA. 
CoAReq : {CoA , HoA , Valid_Interval , CN , SIGHA‘ , 
Cert_ChainHA‘} 
HA checks the validity of the certificate chain and verifies 
the signature contained in the message. Negative result of 
either of them leads to the rejection of message 
 
Step 5 
 
HA sends a PROBE to MN‘s home address to determine if 
the MN is still in the HoA or not.  
PROBE : {HoA , CN , Np} 
 
Step 6 
 
If it is not there, no reply packet is sent to the HA. If the MN 
is there it sends a PROBE CONFIRM to the HA.  
PROBE CONFIRM : {HoA , MN , PREV_SIG1 , 
PREV_SIG2 , PREV_SIG3}  
When the HA does not get a PROBE CONFIRM packet it 
may be because the MN is not there or the PROBE 
REQUEST packet may be lost. To handle the latter case it 
sends a PROBE REQUEST packet after a certain time out. 
This confirms the availability of MN in its Home address. 
 
Step 7 
 
Binding Update Request with Certified(HoA, CoA): 
Where SIGHA= 
SHA(HoA|CoA|Valid_Interval|CN|g
xy|Nm|Nc) 
At the same time, MN obtains the Binding Update key KBU 
in Message 7(b) from HA and therefore, could send out the 
final Binding Update message. 
 Message 7(b). Binding Update Reply (BURep): 
{HoA, CoA, CN, KBU}. 
Step 8: 
MN sends the Binding Update message certified by KBU to 
CN . 
 
V SECURITY ANALYSIS OF EHCBU 
 
We compared the computational expenses for the three 
protocols described in section 2 and the proposed protocol. 
We compared all the protocols by taking the uniform 
computational delay in each message. 
In the figure 5, it is clearly shown that EHCBU has a little 
more computational delay compared to HCBU. However, 
the removal of an assumption of a secure tunnel is overcome 
at the cost of a small increase in computation delay.  
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Fig. 5. Computational delay of the protocols 
 
In addition to the superiority in performance compared  to 
RR procedure, security protection is also assured by the 
proposed scheme.The table 1 shows that only EHCBU is not 
susceptible to false BU attack. 
Table 1 : Security Analysis 
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